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LIMITATION OF NEW JUDGE-MADE




It is commonplace, in the current period, that the high courts of
the states and of the United States make abrupt changes in rules of
common law and in constitutional interpretation. The pressure of social
needs which induces such changes, sometimes described by saying that
the law must be in tune with the times, and must respond to newly
emerging conditions of society,' wars with the proposition that stability
in the law is important to society, capsuled in the rule of stare decisis.
These opposing forces generate uneasiness, yea struggle, in the minds of
appellate judges. The subject of this article is a technique, most often
called "prospective overruling," which facilitates change by limiting
the undermining of stability which a judicially pronounced change would
otherwise produce.
Prospective overruling is a device whereby a court limits the effect
of a new rule to future transactions only, or, more commonly, to future
transactions plus the case before the court which presents the opportunity
for the announcement of the change. Really, though the device is usually
called prospective the distinctive feature of it is the denial or limitation
of overruling, retroactive application of a judicial decision. If every
judicial departure from precedent were limited to prospective operation,
this would fit a philosophy that any judicial decision, at least of a court
of last resort, makes law which remains in effect until a later decision
conflicts with it. But we do not really follow that philosophy, and we
more commonly accept the classical doctrine that a decision which
overrules a previous one is accorded retroactive effect, at least until it
collides with a statute of limitations, an accord and satisfaction, or res
judicata. We employ the technique of prospective overruling as an ex-
ceptional expedient when the traditional retroactivity would wreak more
havoc in society than society's interest in stability will tolerate.
Whatever explanation we may make of prospective overruling in
terms of judicial philosophy, clear it is that the use of the technique
* BA., Cornell 1934, L.L.B. 1938, University of Wisconsin; Attorney, Portage,
Wisconsin, 1938-1942; Office of Price Administration at Milwaukee and Chi-
cago, 1942-1945; Attorney, Milwaukee, 1945-1948 and 1953-1956; Attorney
General of Wisconsin, 1951-1952; Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
1956-1966; presently Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
1 See State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 580-584, 115 N.W.2d 611 (1962).
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makes change less disruptive, and thereby makes an appellate court
less apprehensive about making a change when it considers a new rule
to be more sound than the old.
Prospective overruling is sometimes dubbed "sunbursting," a term
with a degree of aptness, but which came to apply through sheer coin-
cidence. What practicing lawyer would realize that "sunbursting" refers
to a technique in the work of an appellate judge? who has ever imagined
himself an eavesdropper on a conference of justices, and hearing one
remark to another, "How about it, Joe, shall we sunburst this one?"
If one thinks of a judicially pronounced new rule of law as the
rosy dawn of a new day, "sunbursting" has an appropriate connotation.
The word arrived on the scene, however, as the" name.of a party to
litigation which reached the Supreme Court of the United in 1932, Great
Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refiting Company.2
Sunburst, a shipper, had sued Great Northern in Montana for refund
of excessive charges. Sunburst recovered, relying on a rule of law an-
nounced by the Supreme Court of Montana in 1921. When the Sunburst
case reached the Montana high court, the court overruled the 1921 de-
cision, but limited the change to cases arising in the future.3 This was
prospective overruling in its purest form. New law was announced
for cases arising out of future events, but the old rule was applied
to the case at hand, arising out of events which had occurred while
the old rule was the latest word.4
Great Northern was offended at the court's refusal to give it the
immediate benefit of the change in rule, and took the case to the Supreme
Court of the United States. That court decided that no federal right
of the railroad was infringed when the state court disavowed the old
rule for the future, but applied it to the past, including the case at hand.
Mr. Justice Cardozo stated, for the Supreme Court, that in defining
the limits of adherence to precedent, the state "may make a choice for
itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward." On the one hand, he said, "It may say that decisions of
its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for
intermediate transactions." He stated the alternative view as "the ancient
dogma that the law declared by its courts had a Platonic or ideal exis-
tence before the act of declaration, in which event the discredited dec-
2 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
3 Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.2d.927 (1932). Actually the reasoning of the Montana court is largely set forth
in a companion case, Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 91, 194, 7 P.2d 919 (1932). (We should consider ourselves fortunate,
with respect to nomenclature, that it was the Sunburst rather than the Horse
Products case which came before the Supreme Court of the United States.)
4 It will be seen that the announcement of law for future cases only is some-
times criticized as prophetic dictum.
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laration will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered
declaration as law from the beginning."5
High courts which have used the technique of prospective overruling
have done so selectively. One and the same court will permit the new
law announced in some of its overruling decisions to be as completely
retroactive as Blackstone would have it, and in other situations will
choose varied formulae for limitation to prospective operation, depend-
ing on the court's estimate of the disruption which would be caused or
avoided by greater breadth of retroactivity or closer limitation to purely
prospective operation.6 Where a court uses this technique, it often ap-
plies the new rule to the case before the court, but not to other past
transactions. This limited and personalized retroactivity is usually
justified as a reward for a litigant who has persevered in attacking an
unsound rule and as an avoidance of stating the new rule as purely
prophetic dictum.
One of the landmark decisions in this field was made by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in 1959, abrogating immunity of school districts from
tort liability, and limiting the new rule to prospective effect, except for
the case before the court.7 The court gave two reasons for applying the
new rule to the instant case:
First, if we were to merely announce the new rule without apply-
ing it here, such announcement would amount to mere dictum.
Second, and more important, to refuse to apply the new rule here
would deprive appellant of any benefit from his effort and expense
in challenging the old rule which we now declare erroneous.
Thus there would be no incentive to appeal the upholding of pre-
cedent since appellant could not in any event benefit from a re-
versal invalidating it.8
The Supreme Court of the United States recently announced a new
rule excluding identification testimony in criminal trials if based on
exhibition of the accused in the absence of counsel or equivalent pro-
tection. The new rule was announced and applied in two cases, Wade
5 Mr. Justice Cardozo had devoted much thought to the problem presented by
Sunburst long before he was called upon to write the opinion. His earlier ob-
servations have been quoted by Mr. Justice Walter V. Schafer of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in his Benjamin Cardozo Lecture, delivered April 13, 1967
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Mr. Justice
Schafer's lecture is an excellent exposition of this subject, entitled "The
Control of 'Sunbursts': Techniques of Prospective Overruling." It appears
at 42 N.Y.L.U. REv. 631, as well as at volume 22, p. 394, of the Record of the
Association.
6 See Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 157 N.W.2d 595
(1968), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that a decision which
overrules or changes a rule of law is to be applied retroactively, unless there
are compelling judicial reasons to the contrary.
7 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959).
8 Id. at 97.
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and Gilbert,9 which reached the court on direct review. The same point
had been presented in Stovall, a case decided the same day, but in a
review arising out of collateral attack, begun after the possibilities of
direct review had been exhausted. 10 In Stovall, the court denied relief,
and held that, except for Wade and Gilbert, the new rule would apply
only to exhibitions occurring after June 12, 1967, the date all three
decisions were announced.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the court, dealt in Stovall with
the claim that it was unfair to give Wade and Gilbert the benefit of
retroactive application, while denying it to all others, as follows:
We recognize that Wade and Gilbert are, therefore, the only
victims of pretrial confrontations in the absence of their counsel
to have the benefit of the rules established in their cases. That
they must be given that benefit is, however, an unavoidable
consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications
not stand as mere dictum. Sound policies of decision-making,
rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that
we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies, and
in the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance
contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying
Wade and Gilbert the benefit of today's decisions. Inequity ar-
guably results from according the benefit of a new rule to the
parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other liti-
gants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have
raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties
involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant cost for ad-
herence to sound principles of decision making."
I suggest that the decision to "sunburst" or not is reached after
considering a number of factors-(1) How explicitly and how long
ago was the old rule announced or recognized, and how deeply does the
new rule modify the old? (2) Is the old rule of a type which people rely
on in making deliberate choices of conduct or dealing? (3) Was the
old decision really erroneous when made, or have conditions changed
so that it has subsequently become unjust? (4) Is the new rule adopted
primarily because it tends to prevent injustice which could, but need not
always result under the old rule? (5) What is the extent of disruption
which would result from retroactive application? (6) Have recent
decisions suggested the probability of the change in rule?
Once the decision has been made to limit the effect of the new rule,
the extent of the limitation must be chosen. Shall the new rule govern
the instant case? Shall it cover all causes of action which arise after
the date of decision? Shall there be a period after the date of decision
during which a cause of action may arise and not be affected by the
9 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967).
10 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
11 Id. at 301.
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new rule? Shall causes of action which have arisen in the past be af-
fected, but only if a specified stage in the proceedings has not yet been
reached ?
There is no simple rule by which to decide the question whether to
sunburst or not, nor to choose the type of limitation to be employed.
It may be interesting to assemble a few examples of prospective over-
ruling (by no means an exhaustive list) grouped according to the type
of formula employed.12
A. DECISIONS WHERE THE NEW RULE IS ACCORDED No RETROACTIVE
EFFECT, EVEN IN THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF WHICH THE RULE IS
ANNOUNCED, BUT WHERE THE NEW RULE IS TO APPLY TO EVERY CASE
ARISING AFTER THE DATE OF THE DECISION.
As already suggested, generalizations are difficult. We might expect
cases in this group to involve transactions of a type where deliberate
choices have been made in reliance on the old rule. In several of the
examples, however, actual reliance was dubious, but the court was
uncomfortable about making a retroactive change. Several of the exam-
ples are old, well in advance of the present era of frequent change in
judge-made law.
People who believe they have been legally divorced enter into new
marriages in actual reliance on that belief. The Ohio legislature granted
divorces for the first 40 years of statehood. In an 1848 case, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held the legislature had no such power. The court, how-
ever, decided the case before it as if the divorce involved were valid.
It noted tre consequences to children of second marriages if it held all
past legislative divorces void, and said "And in view of this, we are
constrained to content ourselves with simply declaring that the exer-
cise of the power of granting divorces, on the part of the legislature, is
unwarranted and unconstitutional....
In 1952 the Supreme Court of Arkansas considered a claim that a
time-price differential in an installment purchase contract was usurious
under the circumstances. The court cited a number of previous decisions
permitting the lender to recover under similar arrangements. Saying
these decisions had become a rule of property, the court stated it must
not overrule them retroactively. Then the court issued a "caveat" that
similar transactions "entered into after this appeal becomes final, may
be subjected to the taint of usury with the aforementioned decisions af-
fording no protection.' 14
12 It will be apparent that the overruling of specific past decisions is not always
involved. Sometimes the new rule is a break with a well recognized existing
rule or procedure which does not rest upon a particular past decision.
13 Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445, 448 (1848).
14 Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973
(1952).
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This case, involving a type of common commercial transaction is,
like the Ohio case on divorce, a good illustration of limiting a change
in rule to prospective operation because of a real probability of actual
reliance upon the past decisions.
In Gelpcke v. Dubuque,'15 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered a change in a state high court's construction of the state
constitution. In earlier decisions the Iowa court had upheld legislation
authorizing municipal bonds of the type involved in Gelpcke. After the
Gelpcke bonds were issued, the Iowa court helid such legislation invalid
under the state constitution. It is quite apparent that the majority of
the United States court agreed with the earlier decisions on their merits,
but of course the holding was not on that ground. The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the later decision could not be retroactive-
ly applied because such application would impair the obligation of
contracts.
As already indicated the Supreme Court of Montana decided the
Sunburst6 case in conformity with an earlier decision, which it an-
nounced was unsound and was overruled for the future. The older
decision authorized retroactive determination that an established freight
rate had been excessive. The extent of conscious reliance is not very
clear, although the court did speak of reliance. The court also" stated
the theory that where a statute has been judicially construed, such
construction remains part of the statute until reversed or modified.
State v. Bell' was a criminal prosecution of tenants for removal of
crops without following a statutory procedure to protect the rights of
the landlord. An earlier decision had permitted tenants to defend by
showing the landlord was in default on his obligations. The court in
Bell decided to change the rule and strictly enforce the statute, but ac-
knowledged the possibility that Bell had acted in reliance upon advice
of counsel based on the older decision. Because of this possibility of
conscious reliance, the court applied the old rule to the case before the
court, but said the new construction would be applied to all future cases.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico similarly changed its construc-
tion of a statute in deciding an appeal in a criminal prosecution. The
court had previously held that a theater "bank night" was not a lottery.
It changed its view in State v. Jones.'9 But it considered that promoters
of bank nights may have consciously relied on the earlier decision. The
older holding, that bank night was not a lottery, was applied to the
case before the court, but the court announced it would "no longer be
"5 68 U.S. 175, 206 (1963).16 Note 3, supra.
1"Actually in Montana Horse Products Co., the companion case.is 136 N.C. 674,49 S.E. 163 (1904).
19 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
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followed in cases having their origin in acts and conduct occurring sub-
sequent to the effective date of this decision."
A similar situation in a criminal case, except that conscious reliance
seems improbable, came before the Supreme Court of the United States
in James v. United States. 20
James embezzled money in the years 1951 through 1954, did not
report it as income, and was convicted of wilfully attempting to evade
federal income taxes. In 1946, the Supreme Court had decided in Wil-
cox 21 that embezzled money does not constitute taxable income. In 1952
the Supreme Court decided that extorted money does constitute taxable
income.2 2 Wilcox was not overruled, but limited "to its facts." In James
a majority agreed to overrule Wilcox, but a majority (somewhat dif-
ferently composed) agreed to reverse James' conviction and order
dismissed.
Three justices (the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr.
Justice Stewart) voted to overrule Wilcox, but to reverse and dismiss
because wilfulness could not be proved as to acts done while Wilcox
was outstanding. Three justices (Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas,
and Mr. Justice Whitaker) would not have overruled Wilcox and there-
fore voted to reverse and dismiss. Mr. Justice Clark expressed the view
that Wilcox had been overruled in effect, and that in any event James
had not relied on it. He voted to affirm. Two justices, Mr. Justice Har-
lan and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined in overruling Wilcox, but felt
there should be a new trial for redetermination of wilfulness, resolving
any question of actual reliance.
The net result of James was purely prospective overruling. The
technique was not, however, discussed by that name, except for the
opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas. They
disapproved of the technique, especially in the area of criminal law.
The cases above referred to illustrate purely prospective overruling
in areas of domestic relations, commercial transactions, and the criminal
law where the parties before the court may have acted in reliance on
the earlier decisions.
Pronouncement of new procedural rules in decisions of cases have
also, at times, been made prospective only.
In England v. Medical Examiners,23 the Supreme Court of the
United States announced a rule that where a plaintiff in a federal court
action has met with abstention in order that state questions may be
determined by a state court, he may not later return to the federal court
to litigate federal questions if he has freely and without reservation sub-
mitted his federal claim for decision by the state court, litigated them
20 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
21 Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
22 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
23375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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there, and has had them decided there. It was said such plaintiff has
elected to forego his right to return to the federal district court. The
court did not, however, apply the election rule to the plaintiffs before
it. It indicated that although the plaintiffs were mistaken in understand-
ing an earlier decision to compel them to submit the question to the
state court, their mistake was not unreasonable and the court was un-
willing to apply the rule to them.
In a 1965 case2 4 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted, but did
not reach, the question whether the appointment of counsel for an in-
digent at the time of preliminary examination was constitutionally re-
quired. Two justices voted to reach the question and hold that it was.
The court did, however, announce a rule "on grounds of public
policy" that an indigent is entitled to appointed counsel at that stage.
The rule was to be applied prospectively only.
B. DECISIONS IN WHIcH THE NEW RULE IS APPLIED TO THE CASE
BEFORE THE COURT, BUT IS GIVEN No OTHER R.ETROACTIVE EFFECT.
Ordinarily persons who drive carelessly do not do so in conscious
reliance upon some rule of law which may exempt them from liability.
Persons who engage in other conduct which approaches an unintentional,
or even an intentional, tort, do not consciously rely upon some previous
decision which places such conduct on the nonactionable side of a
borderline. Thus there is little reason why retroactive application of a
change in rule would be unfair.
Courts have recognized, however, that one who enjoys a broad im-
munity from liability may consciously rely on it in deciding that he
needs no liability insurance. Conceivably insurance companies may set
premiums in view of a degree of immunity enjoyed by a particular class
of insured.
In abolishing municipal immunity, the Supreme Court of Illinois
applied the new rule to the plaintiff before the court, but otherwise
restricted it to cases arising in the future.2 5 The court mentioned both
the probability that school districts had failed to insure themselves and
that they had failed to investigate past accidents, all in reliance upon
their immunity.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin abolished immunity of charitable
hospitals, 26 immunity of municipal corporations,27 immunity of religious
institutions2s and parental immunity.29 In each case the plaintiff before
the court was given the benefit of the new rule, but all other retroactive
effect was denied. In the case of immunity of municipalities and relig-
24 Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965).
25 Note 7, supra.
26 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 197 N.W.2d 131 (1961).
27 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
2s Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249
(1963).
29 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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ious institutions, even prospective application to other cases was delayed,
as will be mentioned later.
C. DECISIONS IN WHICH A NEW RULE IS ANNOUNCED, BUT ITS
FULL APPLICATION IS DELAYED TO SOME LATER DATE, OR UNTIL CER-
TAIN FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS HAvE COME ABOUT.
As just mentioned under B, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin saw
fit to delay full application of its decisions abrogating immunity of
municipalities and of religious institutions. Holytz,3 0 abolishing munici-
pal immunity, was announced June 5, 1962, and the plaintiff was ac-
corded the benefit of the decision. The new rule was not to apply
otherwise, however, to torts occurring before July 15, 1962. The six
week interval was allowed so that municipalities could make arrange-
ments to meet the new liability.3 1 Widell3 2 abolishing the immunity of
religious institutions, was announced April 30, 1963 and applied to the
case before the court. Its application to other cases was postponed for
two months, to cases arising on and after July 1, 1963.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota devised a formula which gave the
legislature time to deal with the problem by statute before the judge-
made changes would take effect. In 1962, the court reconsidered the
doctrine of municipal immunity and decided it ought to be overruled.
The plaintiff before the court was not given the benefit of the change,
nor was the change to apply to cases arising immediately after the de-
cision. The court stated it would overrule the defense of municipal
immunity in all cases "arising after the next Minnesota Legislature
adjourns, subject to any statutes which now or hereatfer limit or regu-
late the prosecution of such claims. '33
An unusual situation recently came before the appellate court for
the second district of Illinois. 3 4 At the invitation of the Supreme Court
of Illinois, the appellate court tested the public policy supporting the
rule that contributory negligence is a complete defense and concluded
that the type of comparative negligence rule followed in Wisconsin is
preferable. It would doubtless be awkward for an intermediate court to
presume to make so fundamental a change in law throughout the state
until there had been at least an opportunity for review by the state
supreme court. The new rule was therefore said to apply to the case
before the court, but otherwise to "apply only to cases arising out of
future occurrences commencing with the date upon which this decision
becomes final."35
30 Note 27, supra.
31 17 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (1962).
32 19 Wis. 2d 648, 657, 121 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1963.
33 Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621, 264 Minn., 279, 118 N.W.2d
795, 803 (1962). In re Jeruzalis Estate (1964), 269 Mlinn. 183, 130 N.W.2d
473, 481 (1964).34 Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ii. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
3 Id. at 291.
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There are other decisions, not often treated as examples of sun-
bursting, where the sheer weight of circumstances have compelled delay
in full application of a new doctrine.
In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,3 6 for example, the Su-
preme Court of the United States rejected the Plessy doctrine of
"separate but equal" in the field of public education. The court posed
the question whether a decree must necessarily follow that Negro chil-
dren should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or whether
the court, in the exercise of equity powers might permit a gradual ad-
justment. The court's appraisal of the circumstances led it in the latter
course.
3 7
In another field, it could puristically be reasoned that a statute cre-
ating legislative districts in conflict with the constitution is void, and
that past acts of a legislature so elected are void, or at least that all
such acts after the judicial determination of invalidity are void. Decisions
in this field, however, have recognized and avoided the havoc which
would result, utilizing equitable powers only to the extent necessary
to produce the needed change in an orderly fashion.
In Reynolds v. Sims,351 the Supreme Court of the United States said:
With respect to the timing of relief, a court can reasonably en-
deavor to avoid a disruption of the election process which might
result from requiring precipitate changes that could make un-
reasonable or embarrassing demands on a state in adjusting to
the requirements of the court's decree ...
In 1966 circumstances in Georgia brought into play a provision of
the state constitution for election of the governor by its general assem-
bly. It had previously been determined that the general assembly was
malapportioned, but the court had permitted it to continue to function
until 1968. In Fortson v. Morris,3 9 the Supreme Court of the United
States refused to enjoin the election of governor by the malapportioned
general assembly.
In 1964, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held the legislative ap-
portionment statute invalid, under the state constitution, but withheld
redistricting by court decree until the existing legislature (itself elected
under the invalid law) had a reasonable opportunity to act.40
Later, the Wisconsin court took jurisdiction of a case attacking the
districting of county boards, and ultimately held the districting invalid,
but delayed the effective date of the decision, even though elections for
new terms were about to be held under the invalid act, until the legisla-
ture had an opportunity to pass a new law.41
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
38 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964).
39 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
40 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).
41 State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965).
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When the court originally took jurisdiction, it recognized the prob-
lem which might arise out of doubts of the validity of proceedings of
the boards in the interim. It entered an order as follows:
Because of the vital nature of the duties and power of the
county boards of the state and the importance of their ability to
continue to function without challenge to the validity of their
acts, and because it would not be equitable, just, or in the public
interest to hold invalid, on the grounds here raised, any action
before the institution of this proceeding, or during its pendency,
or during a reasonable time thereafter, this court now determines
that if our judgment herein should declare invalid the provisions
of sec. 59.03 (2), Stats., such declaration will expressly be limited
to prospective effect only, after a date following the entry of
judgment and to be specified therein.42
D. NEW RULES, RELATING MORE TO PROCEDURE THAN TO SUBSTAN-
TIVE RIGHTS, APPLIED TO THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF WHICH THE
NEW RULE WAS ANNOUNCED, BUT NOT APPLIED TO CASES WHICH
HAD PREVIOUSLY ARISEN AND WHICH HAD ALREADY PASSED THE
STAGE WHERE THE NEW RULE IS SIGNIFICANT.
The Supreme Court of the United States has evolved several rules
of criminal procedure which are fresh interpretations of the require-
ments of due process. Some of these, like the rule that a state must
furnish counsel to an indigent defendant in at least felony prosecutions,
are deemed so fundamental to "the very integrity of the fact-finding
process"4 3 that they are retroactively applied, even to cases which can
be reached only by collateral attack.
In other instances, the new rule has not been accorded such funda-
mental importance, nor full retroactive application. These new rules
will not be applied to pre-existing cases which have reached a specified
stage of procedure prior to the decision announcing the new rule. The
rules will be applied to pre-existing cases which have not yet reached
that stage.
It is interesting to note that in this class of cases, the Supreme Court
of the United States has not announced any limitation on the retroac-
tivity of the new rule in the decision which adopts the new rule.
Limitations on retroactivity have in these instances been announced
in separate cases in which the new rule, if retroactive, would have
affected the result.
In re Gault,4 for example, which applies certain due process stand-
ards to juvenile offenders, sets forth no limitation on its own retro-
active application, and state courts have divided on that issue.4"
4225 Wis. 2d 177, 130 N.W.2d 569 (1964).
4 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406
(1966).
44 387 U.S. 1 (1967).




The Supreme Court of the United States recently decided that one
can successfully defend himself against a failure to comply with federal
statutes requiring registration of a wagering business or of certain fire-
arms, or with certain related provisions "with a proper assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination." The decisions were rendered on
direct review, rather than on collateral attack, and the privilege had
been claimed on motions before trial, or on motions after verdict. There
are cases still on appeal where the privilege was not claimed in the trial
court, and presumably there are cases where the conviction has become
final, and the sentence is being served, although the privilege was claimed
in the trial court. Apropos of our present subject, questions have risen
whether these decisions will benefit persons in the situations just men-
tioned.
Conceivably there may be some future decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States dealing with a limitation on retroactivity
of Gault, and these later cases.
In 1961, Mapp v. Ohio47 incorporated into due process a rule ex-
cluding evidence obtained by unreasonable search or seizure. Plaintiff
Mapp was given the benefit of the new rule. In 1965 the Supreme Court
of the United States declined to give Linkletter the benefit of the Mapp
rule.48 Linkletter's conviction had become final (i.e. conviction followed
by exhaustion or expiration of right to direct review) before Mlfapp was
announced, and the court decided not to apply Mapp to any case of
that type. Had the court decided not to void any trial at which the
prosecutor, relying on the old rule, used tainted evidence, it might have
declined to apply the new rule to any trial which had started before the
Mapp decision. Such formula would correspond to the Johnson formula
for Escobedo and Miranda.4 9 But sinte the unreasonable search and
seizure was wrongful even under the old rule (though the evidence
might be admissible) it is understandable that the court did not preserve
the admissibility of evidence so seized before Mapp by following a for-
mula corresponding to the later Stovall formula for Wade and Gilbert.
In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States again applied the
Linkletter formula, limiting a new rule to cases where a conviction had
not become final before the date the new rule was announced. In 1965
the court had held that adverse comment by prosecutor or judge upon
a defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial violates the
federal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 5' Six states
46 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968) ; Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
49 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arazona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
50 Note 9, supra.
51 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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had permitted such comment, relying on the former doctrine that the
federal privilege did not bind the states. In 1966, the court decided
Tehan v. Shott 52 arising from one of these states (Ohio), and held
that the Griffin ruling was not to be applied to cases which had become
final before it was announced.
In both Linkletter and Tehan, the court emphasized as a reason for
limiting retroactivity the stress which full application would impose
upon the administration of justice, and weighed such stress against the
dilution of the purposes of the new rules.
Escobedo v. Illinois,53 was decided in 1964 and sparked great debate
over its scope and retroactivity. Miranda v. Arizona,54 was decided, in
the same area, in 1966. There the court codified rules which must be
followed if the results of police interrogation of a person in custody
are to be used as evidence. A week later, in Johnson v. New Jersey55
the court limited the retroactivity of both Escobedo and Miranda. It
did not use the Linkletter formula. This time the new rules were to be
applied to trials beginning after the dates on which Escobedo and Mi-
randa were respectively announced. Perhaps the Stovall formula, to
come later, would have been preferable: i.e. apply the new rules to all
interrogations occurring after the dates of the decisions.
As said earlier, Wade56 and Gilbert5 7 decided June 12, 1967, an-
nounced a new rule excluding identification testimony if based on
exhibition of the accused in the absence of counsel or equivalent pro-
tection. In Stovall, decided the same day, the court did not apply the
new rule, and held it applicable only to lineups occurring after June
12, 1967, except for the lineups involved in Wade and Gilbert. The
formula seems more defensible in terms of reliance than the Linkletter
or Johnson formulas would have been.
The foregoing examples all relate to procedural requirements of
constitutional stature. There have also been instances of changes in
more nearly substantive rights, where the courts have limited the ap-
plication to cases where a particular procedural stage had not been
reached at the time the new rule was announced.
There have been instances, where a court has announced a new
definition of the defense of insanity and the defendant before the court
has been afforded a new trial where the new definition may be used,
but other defendants who had been tried under the older rule were
not given a new trial.58
52 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
53 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
54 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
56 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
57 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
58 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (C.A.D.C. 1954) ; State v. Shof-
fner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 426, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966) ; United States v. Shapiro,
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"PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING-0
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin changed its rule with respect to
liability for contribution of tort-feasors who sustain a common liability.
Under the old rule the burden ultimately was to rest upon each in
equal amount. Under the new rule it was to be apportioned according
to the degree of fault. The doctrine of gross negligence was abolished
in the same decision. The court limited retroactive application, stating
that the new rule should not apply to specified situations, the evident
purpose being to avoid otherwise unnecessary trials or retrials in
matters which had proceeded beyond that stage.59
PROBLEM OF UNEQUAL TREATMENT INHERENT IN
PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING
A degree of awkwardness is inherent in any substantial change in
law. When the legislature makes an important change, it is usually
preceded by committee hearings and debates which inform the public
of the possibility of change and permit people to take steps to reduce
the dislocation in transition. Sometimes the legislature postpones the
effective date for some time after the enactment. If the legal conse-
quences of an event on one day are markedly different from those
of an identical event a day later, the persons who are disadvantaged by
the change may wish it were different, but they have had an opportunity
to learn of the change in advance, and, perhaps, to protect their interests.
A change by judicial decision, applied retroactively as well as pros-
pectively, results in fortuitous inequality of treatment. Identical trans-
actions may have occurred the same day, but the ultimate consequences
may be different because the parties to one achieved a final settlement
or permitted an adjudication to become final before the change was
announced while the parties to the other did not.
Other types of inequality of treatment will result when a court
limits the retroactivity of its overruling decision. A and B, for example,
may be involved in similar contemporaneous transactions. Both may
contest the rule which denies them a particular benefit. A may be lucky
enough to have his case decided against him on the pleadings, without
the delay of a trial, and his course to the coutr of last resort may be
speedy. Suppose the high court overrules precedent, decides in A's favor,
but decides that the new rule shall not be applied to any other case
arising before the announcement of its decision. A is rewarded for his
diligence in challenging a bad rule. B may have been equally, or more,
diligent, but less lucky, and may feel unjustly treated.
A few illustrations of problems of this sort are at hand.
Linkletter was not given the benefit of the Mapp rule, because his
conviction had become final before Mapp was announced. Mr. Justice
383 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Commonwealth v. McHoul, - Mass. -
226 N.E.2d 556, 563 (1967).
59 Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
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Black pointed out, in dissent, that Linkletter committed his offense later
than Miss Mapp committed hers, and the illegal search of Linkletter
occurred' later. Linkletter was unlucky enough, however, to have his
case proceed to finality much more quickly than Miss Mapp's.
Johnson and Miranda were before the Supreme Court of the United
States at the same time, the former's attack on his conviction being
collateral. He was not given the benefit of the new rules adopted in
Miranda's case, though the rules are of constitutional stature. Similarly
with Stovall, Wade, and Gilbert. Stovall was making a collateral attack
and he was not given the benefit of the Wade and Gilbert rule. Johnson
and Stovall were each under sentence of death. The new constitutional
interpretations, given a "sunburst" limitation on retroactivity, did not
signal the "dawn of a new day" for them.
The plaintiff in the case in which the Supreme Court of Illinois
abolished municipal immunity"0 was Thomas Molitor. He was one of
14 children injured in a serious school bus accident. The court limited
the new rule to prospective effect only, except "as to the plaintiff in the
instant case." One justice thought that the new rule should apply to all
the children injured in the same accident.
Two years later the Supreme Court decided an appeal brought by
other children injured in the same accident, including three others in
the Molitor family."' It appeared that all these cases had been pending
when Thomas Molitor appealed and that after the decision in his case,
limiting the retroactive effect of the new rule to him, the other cases
had been dismissed. The Supreme Court, on the second appeal, was
satisfied that when Thomas' appeal was taken "it was commonly under-
stood and accepted that this court's ruling on the dismissal of Thomas
Molitor's claim would be the basis for determining the other claims
arising out of the same bus accident and then pending against defen-
dant." The court decided, in effect, to extend the benefit of the new
rule to them.
It happened that there was an opportunity for a modest recovery
without the benefit of the Molitor ruling. The district had insurance in
effect with an overall limit of $100,000 for one occurrence. This insu-
rance was a waiver of immunity pro tanto, but the total claims exceeded
$2,000,000. After the first Molitor decision, but before the second, some
of the injured children recovered judgment out of the insurance cover-
age. The jury was instructed on policy limits, and these plaintiffs re-
ceived verdicts much smaller than those who went to trial after the
second Molitor decision. The children with the smaller verdicts later
sought new trials, but because of various circumstances the appellate
60 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 24 Ill. App.2d 467,




court for the second district thought there had been no miscarriage of
justice. 2
Holytz6 3 was the decision in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
abolished municipal immunity for most purposes. The court applied the
new rule to the case before it and to other cases arising after an interval
of about five weeks. The Holytz injury was sustained June 24, 1960 and
the case was decided on appeal June 5, 1962. A Mrs. Marshall sustained
an injury February 19, 1961 and she and her husband diligently pursued
a claim against the city of Green Bay. The trial court delayed deciding
the demurrer in the Marshall case to learn the outcome of Holytz, and
then sustained the demurrer because of the Holytz limitation on retro-
activity. The Marshalls appealed and their case was decided January
8, 1963.64 The court conceded the Marshalls had been diligent, but de-
clined to modify the Holytz limitations.
The Marshalls succeeded, however, on a different theory. The city
had insured itself and the policy contained an agreement by the insurer
not to raise the defense of governmental immunity. The court held this
contract a waiver of immunity pro tanto, though it was required to over-
rule a prior case on the city's power to insure in order to reach this
decision.
Olson v. Augsberger,65 is a case where the Wisconsin court, having
previously adopted a new rule and specifically limited its retroactive
application, decided to modify the language of the limitation and thereby
permit a party to enjoy the benefit of the new rule seemed unjust not
to do so.
But it is not always possible nor wise to pull a rabbit out of the hat.
Generally, an express limitation on retroactivity ought to be and is
carefully maintained.66 The foregoing few illustrations at least empha-
size the caution which must be employed and the imagination which
must be drawn upon when a limitation on the retroactivity of a pre-
cedent changing decision is formulated.
Epilogue
The availability of the sunbursting technique relieves some of the
pressure against departure from precedent. Use of this technique serves
the same social interest in stability which is at the root of stare decisis.
Yet there are difficulties and possibilities of injustice which attend
the sunbursting device.
The reader, impressed with these difficulties, may recur to the
old question: Why not stand firmly by at least the definable doctrines
62Larson v. Laneland Community Unit District No. 302, 52 IIl. App.2d 209, 201
N.E.2d 145 (1962).63 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
64 Marshall v. Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 (1963).
65 18 Wis.2d 197, 118 N.W.2d 194 (1962).
66 See Wojtanowski v. St. Josaphat's Congregation, 34 Wis. 2d 1, 148 N.W.2d
54 (1967).
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worked out in past court decisions and leave all changes in course to
the legislature?
But there is great merit in the suggestion that legislatures seem too
thoroughly absorbed in the complex areas of taxation, budget making,
and broad economic and social problems to give adequate attention to
less dramatic areas, where the need for change is constantly being made
apparent to the courts. And there is usually no lobby for the unfortu-
nates who feel the impact of some outmoded rule of tort law or criminal
procedure.
High courts ought to be cautious in exercising their power to change,
but should use it whenever thoroughly satisfied that because of changes
in social conditions a judge-made rule now no longer serves the cause
of justice.
